The State of Trust: Moral Austerity and Canadian Refugee Policy

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Citizenship is as much a legal category as it is a set of self-constituting practices in different sites of power, delineating the boundaries of membership in a political community (Leach, 1998: 183; Yap et al, 2010: 161). During nation building periods of the 19th and early 20th centuries in Canada, citizenship was tied to membership in the nation state and came to provide citizens with formally equal civil, social, and political rights (Marshall, 1992: 27). The state can effectively regulate forms of social identity and the political community by manipulating the category ‘citizen’, (re)configuring the binary of subject (citizen) and other (non-citizen) (Leach, 1998: 189). Internal (with class, race, gender, and other valences) and external (e.g. refugees) others are increasingly delineated according deservingness: citizens are expected to demonstrate responsibility through self-sufficiency and participation in the market (i.e. tying what were entitlements to work); refugees, who cannot participate directly in the market, are expected to demonstrate ‘pre-responsibility’ by following asylum processes and even volunteering labour (Leach, 1998; Yap et al, 2010).

Although citizenship during the Keynesian period developed structural solutions to social problems (e.g. the welfare state) so as to protect people from the vagaries of the market, contemporarily citizenship individualizes vulnerability by making social support – i.e. calling upon the protections accorded to those in the political community – contingent on ‘deservingness’ which is articulated through individual responsibilization (Clarke, 2005).

Canada’s rescindment of refugee healthcare benefits, and the rhetoric used to substantiate this contraction, echo that of 1990s Ontario welfare reform in both content and discursive delivery: individuals and the state must discipline consumption of social services so as to ensure their continued use for the polis. In this paper, we focus on how moral and fiscal austerity drives these reconfigurations in citizenship by examining shifts in labour market and welfare policy and in refugee policy by examining Interim Federal Health Care and Bill C-31 reforms. Tracing the relocation of responsibility to both internal citizens (i.e., political Canadian subjects) and temporary residents (refugee claimants) evidences a reimagining of state-subject relations from entitlement to responsibilization predicated on the narrative that social services are under threat.

Welfare recipients are framed as irresponsible, making poor choices in consumption and employability. Consequently, their claims for support are invalidated and conditionalities, retrenchment, and a culture of distrust are legitimated so as to protect ‘good citizens’ and the future of the welfare state. Extending these conditionalities to refugee determination, as well as the near elimination of all refugee healthcare benefits, reinforces the shift toward individual responsibility and are legitimated by the same narratives of threat: asylum seekers who ‘abuse the process’ so as to gain access to ‘benefits’ are a threat to legitimate refugees, citizens, and the future of the welfare state.

We begin by tracing austerity’s effect on welfare, labour market, and refugee policy before parsing the ways in which citizens and refugees internalize public and policy bisections of good and bad subjecthood.
Austere Trajectories in Social & Refugee Policy

Devolution, Retrenchment, and Federalism

Contractionary economic periods are often met with austerity, in which proponents claim that exorbitant public indebtedness is ruining the major economies and that cutting spending (wages, prices, general spending while cutting taxes) to eliminate deficits and debts would result in economic growth (‘fiscal austerity’) (Levinson, 2013: 93; Blyth, 2013: 2). Austerity policies also have 'lock-in effects,' wherein cuts to public expenditures, revenue, and less economic stimulus leave governments with fewer options for addressing economic downturns (Levinson, 2013; McBride & Whiteside, 2011). In the case of a federal system such as Canada, austere politics or conditions can have a substantial impact on intergovernmental arrangements as the provinces are dependent on the federal government for funding support (Banting, 2006).

While Canada earnestly committed to austerity since the 2008 global financial crisis,¹ austerity politics have been prevalent at the federal and provincial levels for decades (McBride & Whiteside, 2011; Banting, 2006). In the pre-Keynesian era, support for the vulnerable was private, typically provided through charities and the church (Cameron, 2006). Citizenship in the Canadian post-war period saw a consensus between labour (provided reliable workers and good consumers), capital (provided secure jobs and relatively high wages), and the state (mediated labour and capitals’ interests through interventionism and redistributive spending) in creating the foundations of the Fordist production regime (Leach, 1998: 190). This Keynesian consensus represented an expanded notion of citizenship (beyond uniform protection and rights across the country) wherein the public could expect the government would take responsibility for meeting the basic needs of citizens (‘a universality of certain minimums’) (191). At the height of the Canadian Keynesian welfare state in the early 1970s, this took the form of extended unemployment insurance to encompass most of the working class and full indexing of then universal programs of Old Age Security and the Family Allowance to inflation (Cameron, 2006; Banting, 2006).

The late 1970s neoliberal turn (globalization and the liberalization of regulatory, trade, investment, and social policy regimes) drove federal policies toward an 'employability model' which devolved more responsibility for the vagaries of capital to provinces and

¹ Budget 2014 continued several years of social service retrenchment, devolution, and privatization with spending cuts to federal departments and freezes to some public sector operating budgets intended to save $14 billion (MacDonald, 2014).
individuals, flexibilizing and conditioning both to the new expansion strategies of capital (McBride & Whiteside, 2011). Major cuts began in 1977 with the introduction of block funding for health and post-secondary education followed by caps, and the end of assistance based on need once the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) was replaced by the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) in 1995 (then split in 2004) (Cameron, 2006: 68). Federal governments decreased entitlements to Employment Insurance (EI) so that the proportion of unemployed who were able to collect benefits declined from 87% in 1987 to 36% in 2014 (68; Weir, 2013). These shifts reduced overall federal expenditure (a kind of ‘negative spending power’) and entrenched the shift from eligibility based on need to responsibilization, the combination of which drove provincial retrenchment, tightening of eligibility, reduced benefits, and workfare arrangements in the mid-1990s and into the 2000s (Banting, 2006; Lazar, 2006). The legacy of transfer cuts and devolution continue today, as Ontario’s 2014 budget forecasted spending cuts in addition to already entrenched cuts in education ($600mn), children’s and social services ($300mn), and the legacy of healthcare cuts ($800mn in 2012 and $1.1bn in 2011) (Tiessen, 2014; Mackenzie & Hennessy, 2013).

**Policy and the Problematization of Refugees**

While Canadians oft identify refugees as core to our national identity (Environics, 2013), incremental shifts in social and administrative policies in the last decade have initiated a radical reformation of Canada’s relationship with asylum seekers, at both the structural (policy) and individual (citizen-refugee relations) levels (e.g., Root et al., 2014; Shields, 2004). Changes to refugee processing and social service access can be understood within a broader framework of neoliberalizing immigration reform that recognizes and socially constructs immigrants as economic and demographic units (Alboim & Cohl, 2012), a shift underpinned by an asset vs. cost narrative to reframe the value added by non-economic migration streams (Pozniak, 2009).

The Conservatives enacted Bill C-31 (Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act) upon achieving a majority mandate in 2012, and included the most controversial tenets that had been removed from previous bills, C-11 (2011) and C-4 (2012) (CBA, 2013; CCR, 2012). Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Jason Kenney described Bill C-31 as making Canada’s system “faster and fairer” (Béchard & Elgersma, 2012: 2) by increasing ministerial discretion to detain refugees, limiting the timelines available to claimants in Canada, and providing differential access to the IRB based on one’s country of origin (CCR, 2012). Claimants from all countries now experience shorter processing times of just 60 days, limiting their access to legal and translation services. Claimants from states considered ‘safe’ by the Canadian government (a ‘Designated Country of Origin’ [DCO]) do not have access to the Refugee Appeal Division of the IRB and have their claim processed in just 45 days (Dykstra, 2012). ‘Safe’ countries are Canada’s economic and democratic allies and are designated entirely at the Minister’s discretion; this list includes allied states with documented, ongoing human rights abuses, including Mexico and Hungary (CARL, 2015). The DCO list has been criticized for its exercise of influence over IRB Members’ perceptions of claimants’ legitimacy based on their country of origin (Elliot & Payton, 2012).
These process-oriented reforms signalled a fundamental change in Canada’s relationship with refugees, and gave way to the unprecedented overhaul of the Interim Federal Health Program in 2012. From its inception in 1957 to 2012, the IHFP provided uniform health coverage under the IFHP that was equivalent to that received by Canadian citizens receiving social assistance. This included assistance with prescriptions, access to a physician or nurse for primary health services, and some mental health services, (Cleveland, 2012). In June 2012, non-DCO claimants’ coverage was reduced to emergency care only, eliminating all primary health and pharmacare. Further, claimants from a ‘safe’ country saw their coverage reduced to no care, not even emergency assistance, unless their health issue poses a public health risk (CIC, 2012g).

While post-national citizenship ideas based on human rights and personhood sought to transcend the Marshallian framework of citizenship tied firmly to the nation state, the early twenty-first century has seen a ‘re-nationalization’ of citizenship wherein the nation state ‘defends itself’ from multiple threats (Newman, 2013: 44). While this does not suggest a global departure from a citizenship ‘Golden Age’, the reactions by states to various threats, from terrorism to environmental refugees, signals a reversal of gains made during an “emergence of a reinvigorated cosmopolitanism” and further retrenchment to more draconian understandings of the relationship between political membership and human rights (Sassen, 2002: 278).

This citizenship evolution marks a critical juncture through which ‘economic threats’ – such as ‘unsustainable’ welfare states and the ‘undeserving poor’ who rely on them – must be curtailed so as to sustain the future of the nation (and frequently, the ‘deserving poor’) (Newman, 2013: 44). This is articulated in discussions of immigration and asylum as well as through the experiences of internal political citizens and their changing relationship with social welfare entitlements. Canada’s re-nationalization amounted to a fortifying of geopolitical borders by increasing barriers to access, as well as a return of state membership primacy as the genesis of (legitimate) social rights claims.

Subjects of (Dis)Trust

The Moral Matrix of Austerity

Austerity is more than policies of fiscal consolidation, it is a moral economy built around practices of consumption which frame individual responsibility for reduced consumption as a practice of ’good citizenship’ (Knight, 1998; Clarke, 2005). Failing to make the virtuously necessary shared sacrifices compelled by ‘threats’ (e.g. sustainability) undermines the future of the subject and the community (Clarke & Newman 2012, 316). This paper is concerned with how citizenship and asylum for refugees are materially and discursively reconfigured through the logics of moral austerity, such that the ‘irresponsible’ consumption of social services by citizens and refugee claimants threatens the future of the polis, thereby necessitating disciplined consumption. For citizens, this occurs through
the social construction of supply side labour market policy, which works to engender a sense of individual responsibility for employability so as to limit welfare receipt (the consumption of social services).

Moral austerity operates through supply side LMP to construct responsibilized individuals: subjects who internalize a culture of self-discipline and are individually active in cultivating their success, health, and wellbeing, while making them responsible for it and to society (Newman, 2013; Whitworth & Carter, 2014). Responsibilization is based on the assumption that rises in inequality and poverty are a result of individual failings rather than structural design and morally equates self-care, discipline, responsibility, and futurity (‘you are responsible for yourself, but also for your effect on others’) with good citizenship and the realization of future security (Clarke, 2005; Whitworth & Carter, 2014: 110). In the case of supply side LMP, the individual is called upon to ‘activate themselves’ and making (responsible and ‘morally correct’) choices to ensure their self-care (survival) and containment (dependency) through discipline, sacrifice, and reduced consumption (Clarke, 2005; Newman, 2013). The individual's choice in moral austerity is consistently framed in the context of the effect on the community - how the citizen effects the polis - so as to maintain the primacy of the individual while providing a mechanism for responsibilization (Clarke & Newman, 2012). Tying moral worth (and 'good citizenship') with individual austerity is instrumentally useful for inculcating responsibilization.

For refugee claimants, moral austerity presents in a manner that is at once more nuanced yet, in its discourses, arguably more aggressive and explicitly identifiable. Critically, breadth and depth of moral austerity’s expressions in this population, insofar as they relate to responsibilizing persons to reduce consumption and limit their negative effects on others, are mediated by claimants’ purposive exclusion from the citizenry. Claimants are made known that ‘good’ refugees are those who are “hardworking, dedicated, and persevering” who “make sacrifices, learn English as fast and as well as possible, adapt to Canadian culture … and strive to be independent and not rely on the social support system” (Pozniak, 2009: 178). These characteristics arrive alongside reduced employment expectations and a willingness to work hard at any position to demonstrate their commitment to Canada, as well as to perform awareness the common good and sanctity of common resources (Pozniak, 2009). However, because asylum claims sometimes fail and thus, are not necessarily followed by membership in the polity, the ability to leverage the sense of owing sacrifice to fellow community members and the future of one’s community is limited. Instead, claimants are presented with this ‘ideal type’ claimant whose sacrifice is for persons in their future potential polity, as well as for the current citizens around her, whose own citizen sacrifices (in the form of material goods such as healthcare) must to be respected through disciplined consumption. For many, the pull of appeasing a citizen population through demonstrated ‘good’ refugee behaviour is strong, and claimants internalize the messaging of moral austerity as it relates to disciplined refugee consumption of what are framed as decidedly citizens’ resources, such as social assistance and healthcare (see Refugee Worthiness, Citizen Deservingness).

Of Good and Bad Subjects
Government rhetoric and the media shape how the public understands refugees, who are otherwise rarely legible or visible as a population (Patel & Mahtani, 2007; Lacroix, 2004). Since 2008, the Conservative government has repeatedly constructed the refugee as an illegitimate health expense that, if curtailed, would “ensure tax dollars are spent wisely and defend the integrity of our immigration system at the same time” (CIC, 2012g; see also Wherry, 2012; Proussalidis, 2013; Black, 2013; Montreal Gazette 2012; National Post 2012;). While oppositional constructions of us and them has been projected unto refugees since the arrival of ‘boat people’ in the 1980s (Pottie-Sherman & Wilkes, 2014), divisive discourse has evolved from a “language of alterity” (Cresswell & Merrimen, 2011: 260) to one more aggressively underpinned by questions of deservingness, legitimacy, and trust informed by the future of the polis (moral austerity). Indeed, as a social good emblematic of the Canadian identity (Brodie, 2002), fortifying the walls around Canadian healthcare through symbolic retrenchment became necessary in order to continue the current refugee dialectic and that of protecting the institution of citizenship more broadly. As acceptance conditions become more rigid and exclusionary, and opportunities for refugees to demonstrate their symbolic and material commitment to Canada disappear, government-led, public discourses signal to Canadians which refugees are trustworthy, deserving, and legitimate and which are to be excluded. This ongoing social citizenship project is achieved through the discursive dichotomizing between the good and bad refugee, self-enforcing categories that serve to enforce and legitimize one another as well as the narrative of self-sacrificing, humanitarian Canadian citizens.

While ‘good’ refugee claimants are understood as flexible, appreciative, and disciplined subjects who are above all, legitimate in their claim and thus deserving of assistance (Jackson & Bauder, 2014; though as noted, the ‘best’ refugees are those who wait patiently in refugee camps overseas in hopes of being selected by Canada’s overseas refugee determination program [Diop, 2014]), ‘bogus’ or ‘bad’ refugees are those who knowingly enter Canada under false pretences in order to use social services. These ‘bad’ claimants linger in the determination system and forgo work for welfare (National Post, 1997). Minister of CIC, Jason Kenney, indicated in 2010 that Canada’s determination system was ‘overloaded’ with an unprecedented number of bogus claimants attempting to access social benefits (see also Bradimore & Bauder, 2008), provoking fear and policy changes to protect Canada’s social programs. Countries with higher rejection rates at the IRB are considered ‘bogus refugee producing states’, and placed on the DCO list to receive diminished access to resources. Conceptually, the legitimacy and worthiness of all claimants from these democratic, allied nations is questioned, and ethnicities and nationalities – most predominantly, Mexican and Roma refugees – are reified as subjects unworthy of entering fair determination processes.

Despite advocates, legal, and international organizations disputing the basis of a ‘bogus’ refugee on the basis that all persons have the right to seek asylum (UNHCR, 2014; Showler, 2009; CARL, 2015), the discourse continues to effect change, not based on fact but largely, its performance. Discursive metaphors and direct messaging are used to signal to Canadians which nationalities and ethnicities are deserving of assistance and which can be assumed to have ‘jumped the queue’ and thus, are not deserving of a humanitarian response or due process (Diop, 2015). These bisecting narratives act as “conceptual templates, or lenses, for thinking about immigration and immigrants” (Pozniak, 2009 p. 130), and are reproduced in media and government rhetoric (e.g., Hardy &
Philips, 1999; Mountz, 2004; Pozniak, 2009; Elliot, 2012; Elliot & Payton, 2012) and policy discourses (e.g. CIC 2012d; CIC 2012e; CIC 2012f). Media has been instrumental in reproducing and re-appropriating the government lead on bogus refugee framing, acting as “both a conduit for government arguments and a key opinion former” (Mulvey, 2010 p. 433), and being “complicit in delineating the identities of [claimants] as economic migrants and therefore, ‘bogus refugees’” (Mountz, 2004: 334).

Threatening images of organized criminals or terrorists permeating national borders “were joined in the 1980s by that of the ‘bogus refugee’…the claimant of administrative state benefits has merged with the threatening figure of the criminal immigrant” (Pratt and Valverde, 2002: 138), a convergence of fears over welfare fraud and rising immigration. Fear of the unverified refugee accessing public resources spurred the creation of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) in 1990. Entrusted to determine claimants’ legitimacy and thus Canada’s moral and legal obligation towards them, the IRB’s establishment evidences “the struggle in the Canadian refugee system between the concept of human rights - the promotion of ‘deserving’ refugees who warrant access to Canada – and sovereignty – which weeds out ‘economic’ migrants” (Hardy & Philips, 1999: 9; see also Creese, 1992; Bradimore & Bauder, 2011).

Most recently, individuals arriving not on boats but from Canada’s economic and political allies are the subjects of this divisive discourse (Mannik, 2015; Bradimore & Bauder, 2011). The latest wave of bogus refugees are constructed as persons who bypass immigration channels to arrive at the airport and, as the former Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Jason Kenney suggested, ask ‘where they can get their [welfare] cheque from’ (National Post 2012; see also e.g. CIC 2012d; CIC 2012e; CIC 2012f). Forming a discursive linkage between immigration and social welfare abuse to “exclude or deport ‘dangerous foreigners’ for various combinations of moral, racial, and ideological reasons” (Pratt & Valverde, 2002: 136) is an important policy tool during times of economic recession, as well as while Canada reimagines its social citizenship-entitlement matrix. Claimants are constructed as economic threats vis-à-vis their ‘demanding of welfare cheques and social services’ (Bauder, 2008), not just unsolicited arrivals (i.e., boat people) but would-be economic migrants immorally using refugee pathways to “defraud immigration and social services simultaneously”, alongside racialized “crackdowns and populist panics about welfare and about immigration” (Pratt & Valverde, 2002: 135 & 139; see also Hier & Greenberg, 2002; McMaster, 2001 & Marr and Wilkinson, 2003). Noted policy outcomes stemming from legitimacy discourses and the bogus refugee construct include increased deportations (Roberts, 1988), instances of detention (Hardy & Phillips, 1999; Brennan, 2003), implementation of the Canada-Mexico visa in 2009 (Gilbert, 2013), and now, Bill C-31.

Rhetoric of illegitimacy and the need to protect Canadian institutions from undeserving and undisciplined consumers is engaged to “persuade themselves as well as others to change their minds about [the need to change] institutions” by creating a threat and subsequently, providing viable policy ‘solutions’ (Schmidt, 2010: 16; see also Skogstad, 2011). Framing the refugee as a costly individual to be feared is a means to diminish popular support, a gradual process given the refugee’s hallowed image in the Canadian humanitarian narrative (Mountz, 2004; Mannik, 2015; Banting, 2010). Similarly, welfare claimants are disciplined and
reconceptualised along lines of economic sustainability and threat to the future of the polis, exhausting services for ‘hard working’ Canadians (Knight, 1998; Little, 2001).

**Emerging Reconfigurations of Citizenship**

Insofar as good citizenship is increasingly understood through participation in the labour market and independence, the intersection of labour market and welfare policies is a fitting site through which to gauge changes in citizenship. Global pressures to flexibilize labour markets and roll back the social state which protected and supported workers have shifted labour market policy from demand side (e.g. job creation) to ‘active supply side,’ focusing on individuals' employability, responsibility, and attitudes (the ‘supply side’ element) as responses to narratives of welfare dependence, rising fiscal deficits, and structural unemployment in the late 1980s and 1990s (Herd et al, 2009; Lightman et al, 2006; Dunk, 2002). Responsibilization informs contemporary supply side labour market policy in Canada which ties welfare to work (‘workfare’) and privileges rapid job placement (‘work-first’), consequently forgoing substantial skill investment (Herd et al, 2009; Little, 2001). In the context of austerity, citizens are expected to ‘activate’ themselves in making rational and responsible choices in their pursuit of self-sustainment (Clarke, 2005: 448; Newman, 2013: 43). For the poor and unemployed, compulsory workfare programs socially construct self-regulating citizens through tenets of individual responsibility and attitudinal adjustment to lower expectations, reduced consumption, and be flexible (Clarke, 2005: 448; Little, 2001: 8). Although these programs constructs citizens as autonomous, they are informed by a moral delineations of legitimate dependency and the ‘looming’ threat of abusers and a decadent benefits for the future of social services for the polis (moral austerity).

The devolution of federal support for social assistance and labour market policy drove the provinces to further devolve the implementation - and increasingly, financial burden – of ‘workfare’ (e.g. Ontario Works) onto municipalities (who then often employed private contractors) (Herd et al, 2009: 133). Such programs were based on the idea that unemployment and poverty were individual failings in lacking skills, education, attitudes, morality, responsibility, and flexibility (Herd et al, 2009: 129; Lightman et al, 2006). Further, politicians, the media, and the public promulgated the idea that welfare receipt would undermine self-sufficiency and engender laziness, resulting in long term reliance on public assistance and a drag on social services, the state, and society (constituting a ‘threat’ to the sustainability of social services) (Clarke, 2005; Herd et al, 2009: 131). This frame individualizes blame, ignores structural realities of labour markets and systemic forces which create poverty and unemployment (Little, 2001: 15). Fiscal austerity provides the material ‘necessity’ for implementing policy proscriptions which inculcate moral austerity, such that shifting citizenship (via compulsion and ‘incentives’) from entitlements to individual obligations (via responsibilization) is necessary to prevent ‘decadent’ benefits and dependency, both framed as threats to the future of the polis (Little, 2001; Clarke & Newman, 2012).
From the moment people enter into these programs "work, independence, and dignity are symbolically linked"\textsuperscript{2} (Little in Herd et al, 2009: 129; Lightman et al, 2006; Dunk, 2002). These low cost programs focus primarily on shaping participants' attitudes, focusing daily on the financial and psychological value of work, independence, work ethic, and individual responsibility to develop 'realistic expectations' about the labour market: as a facilitator said, "take a lower-paying job at this time. Be realistic" (146). Negative situations, such as job loss, poverty, and even family death could be 'resolved' through individual attitudinal adjustment according to facilitators: "you can be sad, depressed, angry… you have to find another road" (145).

For example, Ontario implemented Ontario Works in 1997, a compulsory workfare program focused on rapidly attaching participants to available jobs (Herd et al, 2009: 133). The program was characterized by proscriptive rules, ever decreasing funding, and narrow provincial performance measures (133). Participation is compulsory\textsuperscript{3} as participants cannot quit a placement, refuse an offer of employment, or refuse to look for work without losing all welfare eligibility (22). Ontario Works, like other work-first workfare programs, emphasized attitudinal adjustment, minimal retraining, and job search skills (e.g. communication, problem solving, assertiveness, and time management) in short term, low cost programs: in a 2009 study of four municipal programs in Ontario, all focused primarily on 'life skills' such as resume preparation, job coaching, interview preparation, employers' expectations; some focused specifically on work ethics, increased motivation, positively adjusting attitudes, and provide coping strategies; failure to attend resulted in financial sanctions (Herd et al, 2009: 139; Lightman et al, 2006).

Shifts in citizenship marked by workfare illustrate how policy changes informed by moral and fiscal austerity align in disproportionately affecting the most vulnerable – those who must rely on the state (or attempt to) – demonstrating how citizenship is most explicitly ‘felt’ when you need it. In the case of austerity and supply side (‘workfare’) LMP, these policies operates as a moral project to conduct citizens' behaviour and attitudes toward individual responsibility and employability as conditions for social support, as former Ontario Premier Mike Harris' goal of creating a system which "rewards […] values such as hard work, personal responsibility, self-reliance, [and] individual initiative" (Knight, 1998: 127).

**Non-Citizens and the Reconfiguration of Citizenship**

The narrative supporting concern that welfare erodes self-sufficiency and subjugates citizens into long-term reliance (e.g., Herd, Lightman, & Mitchell, 2009) is also deployed to support refugee health and administrative reforms, evidencing a broader shift

\textsuperscript{2} Enforced by anti-fraud measures which place claimants under intense surveillance of professional and financial activities (Little, 2001).

\textsuperscript{3} Failure to attend, not completing sufficient hours, leaving early, or refusing employment results in the withdrawal of benefits (Herd et al, 2009: 136).
in the citizenship-entitlement matrix. Cautionary tales of refugee welfare dependency and moreover, *bogus* refugees’ welfare dependency advance concern regarding (i) the risk of inculcating a culture of dependency within even legitimate refugees, and (ii) the role of social service provision in attracting fraudulent, illegitimate claimants. At the onset, all refugees who make a claim at Canadian borders are considered suspect, and claimants, a drain on the system (Pozniak, 2009). While the ‘good’ vs. ‘bad’ refugee dichotomy is applied to discursively bisect deserving and undeserving refugee claimants (see *Of Good and Bad Subjects*), the ‘best’ refugees are not claimants at all, but instead, those who wait patiently in refugee camps overseas and are brought to Canada once determined to be a legitimate and deserving entry. In contrast refugee *claimants*, or persons who make a refugee claim at a port of entry and receive a refugee adjudication in Canada, are unsolicited visitors, seen as a “burden to the state since their successful integration to Canada is seen as depending on the state’s capacity to provide adequate settlement services to them” (Li, 2003: 47). Refugee claimants’ queue-jumping nature (either leaving the global refugee queue, or, abusing the refugee system by leaping over the *economic* migrant queue [Diop, 2014]) is thought to represent a freeloading disposition, and such claimants seek not to work but to access ‘free’ social services, only to be removed following a negative refugee decision. If genuine, refugees are permitted to remain; however, even at this juncture, concern rises regarding the value and purpose of having provided ‘free’ social services. Accessing social assistance and the unrestricted consumption of health care resources is feared as inculcating claimants with an immediate dependency on the state that would extend into their lives as citizens. The risk of cultivating dependency on a population unscreened for their economic potential raises flags, and this concern is compounded by claimants’ lack of contribution through income taxation.

Reactions to both of these dependency and abuse fears include (i) attempting to activate and responsibilize refugee claimants into disciplined use of common resources; (ii) increasing the conditions or requirements of persons to lodge a successful claim (through tightened entry restrictions and greater scrutiny – see *Policy and the Problematization of Refugees*); and (ii) the near complete removal of services and claimants’ ability to access resources. These reforms serve as complementary policies in the greater citizenship entitlement reformation project. Deploying complementary systems of reform works to legitimize and support broader ideological shifts, while also reconditioning persons’ response to and familiarity with new policy approaches and programming (Pierson, 2000). Narrowing the points of entry through which refugees can access Canadian political or social citizenship not only bolsters the broader shift from entitlement to conditionality in internal citizens’ social citizenship access, but of legitimizing and validating the sacrifices these citizens have made to ensure the security of its future. Instead of inviting persons to ask why Canadians do not also receive ‘added benefits’ such as prescription insurance, Canadians are encouraged to demand why non-citizens, regardless of situation, received benefits that *Canadian citizens* do not (e.g., Baluja, 2012; CBC, 2012; CBC, 2014).

*Responsibilizing Refugees and the Activation of Non-Citizens*
Claimants’ entitlement to healthcare and social assistance resources by virtue of lodging an asylum claim at a port of entry (i.e., evidence of postnational citizenship) is at odds with the internal shift in social citizenship within Canada. If Canadian citizens are not only made to demonstrate deservingness and responsibility to receive basic social welfare benefits but internalize this mantra to re-project is disciplining effects unto other citizens, then providing full, unquestioned social entitlements from non-citizens – who do not contribute, who do not (cannot) perform deservingness – is most often understood as unjust (e.g., CBC, 2012; CBC, 2014). The most visceral of such transgressions is evidently refugees’ entitlement to the zenith of Canada’s liberal democratic identity, healthcare insurance.

As noted, in 2012, fear that refugee claimants were accessing resources without concern for their own contribution or the breadth of their consumption prompted the creation of more stringent conditions were enacted in the refugee determination process, and refugee healthcare entitlements were dramatically reduced. Given the parallels with social assistance reformation in Ontario, the question then arises: how can refugees demonstrate responsibility, and moreover, how can the state responsibilize refugees as non-citizens? Broadly, refugees cannot be morally disciplined as citizens can; efforts to responsibilize will be directed and then manifested in different ways. While state-citizen relations can be reimagined through both policy reform and the cognitive, emotive reconditioning of citizens’ perceptions of notions of entitlement, practical limitations prevent the reformation of state- non citizen (refugee) relations in the same disciplined fashion, leaving extreme policy reform – from full healthcare entitlement to its near-elimination – a most effective policy option.

Of note is that activation policies and the push towards self-responsibility are not contained to subjects who hold political membership. Efforts to limit dependency, articulate what it means to engage in legitimate consumption, and instil a sense of moral indignation to those operating outside those parameters have been extended to non-citizens attempting permeate renationalized, refortified citizenship borders on humanitarian claims. The notion of activating refugees from seemingly passive aid recipients void of agency to engaged, contributing members is linked to pre-emptively installing desirable citizenship characteristics into future citizens, or at least disciplining the consumption of those who are to be deported. Mechanisms such as encouraging refugee volunteering, the offering of free labour, have been proposed as means of activating refugees without compromising citizens’ economic opportunities so as to construct “citizenship as something that must be earned through labour” (United Kingdom Home Office, 2008; Jordans, 2015; Yap et al., 2010: 168). Recalling Clark & Newman’s (1997) assertion that fears of the Other (invading space, invading culture, using resources) has led to the re-nationalization of borders and citizenship, Canada’s increasingly rigid conditions for refugee acceptance signals a return to the foregrounding of political membership in substantiating and legitimizing social citizenship claims. This (i) hardening of geopolitical borders and (ii) re-definition of how rights and resources are accessed along actively performed mechanisms of self-discipline are related and inertial forces in the reimagining of citizenship. Good citizens and refugees are pitted against their ‘bad’ counterparts through the logic of moral austerity – disciplined consumption to secure the future – to legitimate the retrenchment and devolution of responsibility for precarity to the individual. ‘Bad’ subjects made immoral (e.g. refugees ignoring state processes to
access ‘benefits’) or poor (e.g. welfare recipients who did not make themselves employable) choices and acted irresponsibly, threatening the future of the polies through dependence.

Refugee Deservingness & Citizen Worthiness

Articulating Deservingness: The Social Construction of Political & Public Rhetoric

In the public sphere – promulgated by politicians, the media, and the broad circulation of discourses – discussions of deservingness are frequent and inform the construction of policies (and subsequently, their recipients). For example the Canada Election Study (CES) 2011 indicated that 55.9% of Canadians believe that benefits for the unemployed ‘discourage work’ and self-sufficiency, while 56.8% believed that people were individually responsible for their failures (Fournier et al, 2011).

Politicians and bureaucrats have frequently argued that social services can only be sustained if the undeserving do not ‘take advantage’ of them. As Mark Darroch, the director of community services and Ontario Works for Renfrew County, has argued "we want to be able to help the people who truly need the support [but] our social assistance programs can only continue if everyone plays fairly [and if we] weed out the cheaters and abusers of the system" (County of Renfrew, 2000). Former Human Resources Minister Diane Finley argued against raising employment insurance payments or expanding eligibility because "we do not want to make it lucrative for them to stay home and get paid for it" as that would be a cost "we cannot afford" (Ewart & Hemingway, 2009). Finally, the media is replete with moralizing pangs that “if welfare rates are too high, people won’t go to work” (Wente, 2012). Overall, notions of deservingness and sustainability are reconciled through responsibilization, as Prime Minister Harper has said: "we can maintain [our] standard of living […] but we have to govern ourselves responsibly, we have to live within our means … to grab that [competitive] future" (Harper, 2013).

When speaking of those outside the formal political community, rhetoric alludes to futurity but also remains firm in its assertion to protect the present. Politicians adopt a “discourse of tough authority” (Morrison, 2003: 273) to describe, in no uncertain terms, the onus placed on Canada to protect itself against bogus invaders through strict policy reform.

"The real question is why were we providing them with tax-funded health insurance in the past? That's what Canadians have been asking us and that's why we've acted in this way" (Former Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Jason Kenney, in CBC, 2012)

"The sooner the Ontario government gets serious about protecting Ontario taxpayers and stops undermining the success of our national refugee reforms, the better and fairer it will be for all Canadians, including legal immigrants and genuine
refugees” (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Chris Alexander [in CBC, 2014], responding to Ontario’s decision to fund refugee healthcare).

Although ‘deservingness’ is frequently articulated as a criteria for social support (or even membership in the community) among the general public, it is even articulated among the vulnerable (Leach, 1998: 181; Little, 2001: 9). Exposure to hegemonic ideas (contemporarily, of meritocracy and responsibilized citizenship) can increase vulnerable people’s opposition to policies which would benefit them (Sengupta & Sibley, 2013: 1391). However, subjectivities and understandings of politics are not just discursive, but are informed by material realities, such that when faced with exclusion from entitlement, subjects often draw on discourses which distinguish between their deservingness and that of others (Leach, 1998):

One participant said “a lot of people abuse the system [...] they’re going on trips and [...] sucking the system” while another voiced strong objections to those who are able to work and don't: "it’s not fair for people who do need [government income support]” (Reutter et al, 2009: 305).

"[‘The really needy’] get a pay cheque and they blow it the first week, but they know they can go to the food bank [...] They really get a lot. They get clothing allowances, they get more baby bonus now” (Participant #2; Leach, 1998: 186).

"If that [welfare] wasn’t there, these people would be forced to mould themselves [...] so they could get that job" (Participant #1; Leach, 1998: 186).

"Some people that are on it [social assistance] don't even deserve it or even need it, and they just misuse it. And it's awful for people who do need it" (Participant #1; Reutter, 2006: 12).

Similar orations are heard within the refugee claimant community. Research indicates that the hegemonic refugee discourses discussed above has the effect of shaping claimants’ experiences but also become lenses through which claimants understand their position and worth in Canada. The notion of good/bad refugees is known amongst its subjects, and becomes the standard around which refugees position themselves and others (Warburton & Smith, 2003). Pozniak (2009) found that “the association of ‘refugees’ with ‘welfare’ is strong in the sensibilities of both recent and more established newcomers,” describing many newcomers who “confessed that they prefer not to associate with recent Colombian newcomers whom they see as a burden on the system and sometimes even as cheating the system” (183). Persons described their conscious adoption of what they perceived as “mainstream Canada’s” view towards immigrants and refugees, and discipline their behaviour around these dialogues (Yap, 2010; Pozniak, 2009), elements of which they then wove through their assertions of self.
Claimants interviewed about the role of divisive discourses in mediating employment outcomes expressed similar sentiment:

“I don’t want to stay at home expecting a cheque for the social assistance ... Part-time, full-time; it will be very important for me” (Claimant living in Toronto; Jackson & Bauder, 2015: 14).

“When the [refugee] people come to here, they apply for welfare ... But [some] know, we need to study. Why? To get better jobs. We get a good job, we’re going to make good taxes for the government! Cause that is important here" (Claimant living in Toronto; Jackson & Bauder, 2015: 14).

Similarly, Yap et al. (2008) find different subject positions of refugees, “and ideas about a hierarchy of refugees were apparent in some participants’ accounts. It is possible that volunteering as evidence of active citizenship would reinforce such ideas of a hierarchy of refugees, with some refugees seen as more deserving of citizenship than others” (162).

**Articulating Responsibilization: The Internalization of Supply-Side LMP Logics**

While the rhetoric of deservingness is commonly disseminated and at times internalized – as demonstrated above – it is also important to parse the ways in which policy discourses and logics can be internalized. Workfare LMP engenders a sense of individual responsibility for precarity so as to socially construct citizens to be employable, flexible, and constantly ‘working on themselves’ (Dunk, 2002):

"Life is what you make it if you can. Like nobody's going to give you anything [...] Like they should give me a job [...] It doesn't work that way" (Canadian participant; Dunk, 2002: 888).

Another effect of supply side LMP is that expectations and aspirations for control over work (let alone for gratifying work) are lowered so as to inure people to repeated deprivation and frustration:

“I had a few bad jobs then found a full time job working in a factory just outside of town. Less money, no benefits and I have to contribute to my own pension, but to tell you the truth I’m relieved I found something at least to keep a roof over my head and pay my bills" (Canadian participant; Vrankulj, 2012: 31).

In the case of refugees, awareness and adeptness with the substantive ideas behind the reformed refugee policies “stem from interactions with government agencies, community service agencies, the media, “mainstream” Canadians, and, interestingly, other
For example, limited provisions associated with welfare and now, healthcare are intended to procure a feeling of discomfort in order to discourage false, illegitimate claimants. Speaking to its limited provisions and social stigma, a male claimant in Toronto described welfare as “uncomfortable” (Jackson & Bauder, 2014: 13). The individual described negative public perceptions towards refugees as limiting employment opportunities and forcing him to access social assistance: “I had no choice, because I couldn’t sleep outside, I had to eat something” (ibid).

Finally, there is an inherent futurity in supply side LMP’s (meagre) ‘skills investment’, letting go of expectations rooted in the past to prepare yourself for the new future. This is evidenced in a statement made during a retraining program after a layoff at a Canadian paper mill: "success is said to require 'letting go of old patterns and behaviors' and 'looking forward to change as a challenge, taking risks and innovating'" (Dunk, 2002: 887).

The need to "just get over it" was accepted by these workers as a necessary part of dealing with the layoff. "[The retraining program] was good […] Like they helped with the resumes and they [helped] people realize that the place was shut down and that's the big, big thing […] I think that was the whole idea of [the training program]" (Canadian participant; Dunk, 2002: 888).

**Conclusion: Who is Legible to the Austere Community?**

Policy and public articulations of deservingness and responsibility construct ‘bad’ citizens and refugees as scapegoats, as threats to the sustainability of social services and of social support for ‘good’ citizens/refugees into the future. Similarly, the state ‘enables’ abuse with decadent programs (not providing incentive/coercion for individual responsibility) (Edmiston, 2014: 118; County of Renfrew, 2000). As such, retrenching (to ensure fiscal sustainability: fiscal austerity) and disciplining access to these services (to weed out ‘abusers’) are a virtuously necessary acts to protect the future of the polis (moral austerity)

The responsibilizing narrative for citizens and the narrative of future polity sacrifice for refugees are attempts to reconfigure the polis by manipulating how membership is delineated, ultimately through ex-nominated notions of deservingness. However, socially constructing responsibilized citizenship obfuscates the state’s abnegation for social support, constituting an abandoned citizen made utterly vulnerable to the vagaries and violences of the market and statelessness (Newman, 2013: 452).

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4 Of course, austerity contributes to the unsustainability of welfare states.


